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U.S. VISIT
U.S. VISIT: Enhancing Border Security or Exemplifying Optical Solutions in our Post 9/11 Universe
October 4, 2004 -- By Kathleen Campbell Walker[1]
The new United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (“US VISIT”) program announced by Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge in his April 29, 2003 was heralded as a 21st century technology answer to the long standing Sphinx-like conundrum of how to implement an exit-entry system at our ports of entry to the United States (“U.S.”) without damaging our economy. Secretary Ridge noted that the US VISIT system will replace the currently existing National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”) program as well as encompass the Congressional requirements of the automated entry-exit system.[2] Although US VISIT sounds impressive and certainly a far cry from the pictures of the El Paso port of entry in the 1800’s pictured here, the program is still not the panacea for a worried U.S. public concerned with the interdiction of potential terrorists.
A little history about Section 110 of IIRAIRA
It is important to remember that the roots of US VISIT are firmly tied to Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRAIRA”).[3] About seven years ago, Congress directed the Attorney General to develop an automated entry/exit system to collect records of arrival and departure from every alien entering and leaving the U.S. On June 15, 2000, Congress amended section 110 with the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2002 (“DMIA”), which was sponsored by Lamar Smith (R-San Antonio, Texas), in response to strong opposition from the business sector. A broad coalition of organizations sought the repeal of Section 110, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Travel Industry of America, the Border Trade Alliance, and over 200 companies and associations as part of the Americans for Better Borders Coalition.
The DMIA included a provision to establish a task force to make recommendations concerning the implementation of an entry/exit system and other alternatives to improve legitimate cross-border traffic, security, and coordination.[4] The efforts to create the mandated Task Force in the DMIA were delayed until late in 2001.[5]
Section two of the DMIA states that, “Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the Attorney General or the Secretary of State to impose any new documentary or data collection requirements on any person in order to satisfy the requirements” of section 110 of IIRAIRA. In addition, this section also states that no requirements inconsistent with the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) may be imposed. The efforts to create the mandated Task Force in the DMIA were delayed until late in 2001.[6] The proposal of US VISIT to collect biometric data on all applicants for admission would seem to be in direct contravention of this provision concerning section 110 as well as NAFTA.
Earlier in March of 1999, 15 members of the House of Representatives attempted to limit the implementation of section 110 to air ports of entry by introducing H.R. 1250. Unfortunately, the House took no further legislative action on this bill. At the same time, 24 Senators introduced S. 745 to exempt land ports of entry from section 110, but the bill was not enacted.
S. 1360 was introduced in 1997 as the Border Improvement and Immigration Act of 1997 (“BIIA”) by Senators Abraham, Kennedy, D’Amato, Leahy, Collins, Snowe and others. This bill proposed to exempt land borders from section 110, as well as permanent residents, and those for whom the documentary requirements of section 212(a)(7)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, had been waived. Thus, Canadian citizens and Mexican laser visa holders would not be subject to such exit-entry controls. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report issued on June 1, 1998 (the “BIIA Senate Report”) concerning this bill has many enlightening revelations as to the use of entry-exit control (now US VISIT) on tracking visa overstayers and interdicting terrorists. [7] On these issues, the BIIA Senate Report stated:
“The Committee is keenly aware that implementing an automated entry-exit control system has absolutely nothing to do with countering drug trafficking, and halting the entry of terrorists into the United States, or with any other illegal activity near the borders. An automated entry-exit control system will at best provide information only on those who have overstayed their visas. Even if a vast database of millions of visa overstayers could be developed, this database will in no way provide information as to which individuals might be engaging in other unlawful activity. It will accordingly provide no assistance in identifying terrorists, drug traffickers, or other criminals.”[8](emphasis added)
This conclusion would at least seem pertinent in response to the Department of Homeland Security’s claims as the goals of US VISIT. The BIIA Senate Report notes that as to tracking visa overstayers:
“Even if a list of names and passport numbers of visa overstayers would be available, there would be no information as to where the individuals could be located. Even if there was information at the time of entry as to where an alien was expecting to go in the United States, it cannot be expected that 6 or more months later the alien would be at the same location. Particularly, if an alien were intending to overstay, it is likely that the alien would have provided only a temporary or false location as to where the alien was intending to go.”[9]
From a trade perspective, the Report also includes the very compelling example provided by Dan Stamper, president of the Detroit International Bridge Co. Mr. Stamper testified that the Ambassador Bridge handles approximately 30,000 vehicle crossings per day. Mr. Stamper calculated that, “assum[ing] the most efficient and remarkable entry and exit procedures in the world [that] will take only 30 seconds per vehicle, and making the equally optimistic assumption that only half of the vehicles have to go through procedures, that would amount to an extra 3,750 minutes of additional processing time each day.” As he sagely pointed out, “There are only 1,440 minutes a day.” Thus, the implementation of section 110 would effectively close the border.
In response to these comments among others, Senator Kennedy developed an amendment to S. 1360 that would not require section 110 implementation at land and seaports, but which would cover airports and be applied to legal permanent residents among others.
So based on this seven-year history, why are we now hailing US VISIT with its mother of all biometric status goals as a viable solution to terrorist interdiction? Have the horrific events of September 11 permanently clouded our vision and logic? The issue here is that this is a time for real solutions not optical ones. There is absolutely no excuse to give the public hope that US VISIT is an effective solution to terrorist interdiction. Have we learned nothing from September 11?
We have miles of space between our land ports of entry with limited staffing from the border patrol to interdict illicit border-crossers. If someone enters at an airport or seaport in January of next year, post implementation of this new US VISIT system, it does not mean that they will depart via the same means of transportation or even through any port of entry. The key here would seem to be adequate staffing and funding of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement in order to follow up on status checks of those at least admitted to the U.S. and adequate staffing and funding of intelligence efforts to identify those that may desire to harm us.
The Implications and Challenges of US VISIT
Appreciating the implications and challenges of US VISIT requires an understanding of a multitude of factors such as: the definition of the “BORDER,” the history of Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRAIRA”),[10] the difference between ports of entry and controlling the area between our ports, the difference between US VISIT and the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”), machine readable documents and port infrastructure, database integration, rolled versus flat prints, biometrics, false match rates, the function of the International Civil Aviation Organization, text versus biometric based database and their interoperability, the two versus ten print baseline, etc.
Why do we care?
Practicing immigration is challenging enough with its daily changes, so why spend the time to figure out this “border” thing, US VISIT? It is time for all of us to realize that the “virtual border” created post 9/11 via a multitude of legislation [11] has an impact upon all of our practices. The “virtual border” includes all ports of entry, air-land-sea. LAX, JFK, DFW, these airports are all a part of US VISIT; although a long way away from any land border with the U.S. The virtual border is located in other countries as well. For example, pre-flight inspection is now conducted in fourteen overseas locations, including Canada.[12] The Department of State’s consular posts are also a part of the virtual border from the perspective of gaining approval for application for admission to the U.S.
Part of the “manifest destiny” of the inspections process is to push back the biometric intake and database review required under US VISIT (two print fingerprint and digital photograph) to the consular posts abroad to reduce congestion at the ports of entry upon application for admission.[13] Even with this approach, intake of biometrics at consular posts, the current logic is that each application for admission under US VISIT will require the submission of a two print fingerprint. For frequent border crossers or international travelers, the utility of such redundant checks is a clear example of wasted resources. At ports of entry, these prints are taken in secondary inspections. As noted below, in 2002, only about two percent of the applicants for admission were referred to secondary for further review. US VISIT will mandate that basically all inspections turn into secondary inspections. Also, as noted below, there is not enough space now for current inspections to be conducted at our ports of entry, so from whence does the staffing and infrastructure come? As the saying goes, you can’t get blood from a turnip.
Further, US VISIT does not yet clearly exempt legal permanent residents, Mexican laser visa holders, nationals entering under the Visa Waiver Program (“VWP”), or Canadian citizens. Although the Press Release Fact Sheet published by the Department of Homeland Security mentions the use of passenger manifests to track those entering the U.S. via an airport under the VWP, it does not indicate that such manifests will result in the VWP applicants for admission being exempt from the process required under US VISIT.[14] The Press Release does confirm that when US VISIT is fully implemented, it will provide the information necessary to account for nearly “all temporary foreign visitors in the United States.” [15] Thus, any remaining elements of NSEERS, such as port arrival registration, will become part of the US VISIT program.[16]
Distinguishing NSEERS from US VISIT
It is very important to keep the line of demarcation between NSEERS and US VISIT bright. There should not just be a thin red line, but a thick one here. NSEERS emerged from an internal Department of Justice (“DOJ”) draft memorandum produced by Viet D. Dinh, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy, entitled, Registration of Aliens from Countries Sponsoring Terrorism and Other High Risk Countries.[17] NSEERS is a program blatantly based on ethnic profiling. Although DOJ defended the program in that any nonimmigrant alien could be subject to registration at the ports of entry, [18] the base premise of the program was tied to being a national or citizen of designated countries. [19] At ports of entry, those subject to NSEERS were typically ten printed and photographed and subject to an additional interview to gather information. Any addition, once subject to NSEERS, the person had to comply with additional registration requirements after admission and restriction to departure from the U.S. only from specified ports of departure.[20] Mr. Kobach, Counsel to the Attorney General, pitched NSEERS at a January 2003 foreign press briefing, as a method “to get control of our borders and a sense of where visitors were and what they were doing,” [21] and tied NSEERS to a partial implementation of exit-entry control.
Tracking overstays is not the same mission as terrorist interdiction. In addition, the process applied for admission of those subject to NSEERS registration is totally different than the process applied to those subject to US VISIT. The focus of NSEERS is to identify and track those from “high risk” countries. Although NSEERS may eventually become a sub-set of US VISIT, certainly the veneer of terrorist interdiction should not be used to coat US VISIT, which applies to our most favored trading partners. While there is a nexus between NSEERS and US VISIT at the point of inspection at a port of entry, the methodology and premise for the two programs arises from different missions. An excerpt from the Statement of Senator Slade Gorton before the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration is pertinent here. He was commenting on the incident in December of 1999 at Port Angeles, Washington in which a man, Ahmed Ressam, attempted to cross via ferry into the U.S. and was found to have bomb-making materials in his trunk. He stated that:
“No doubt, proponents of Section 110 will use the apprehension of Ahmed Ressam and his alleged associates as an argument for retention of Section 110. I believe this would be unfortunate, as the existence of an automated entry-exit control would not have kept Ressam out. It was through the experience and instinct of Inspector Dean that Ressam was detained and, ultimately, apprehended. What we need is more Inspector Deans, not more congestion.”[22]
Thus, to try to sell US VISIT for its terrorism interdiction benefits seems at best, a weak claim. Also, it continues the insidious tendency post September 11 to equate terrorism with immigration whether legal or illegal.
Events and Deadlines of Interest
1. On December 31, 2003, US VISIT will implement section 110 of IIRAIRA by requiring that an entry-exit system integrate arrival and departure information at all airports and seaports.[23]
2. On December 31, 2004, US VISIT will be expanded to include the 50 busiest land ports.[24]
3. On December 31, 2005, US VISIT will be further expanded to encompass the remaining land ports of entry.[25]
4. On May 19, 2003 in prepared remarks by Asa Hutchinson, Under Secretary of the Border and Transportation Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security,[26] he outlined that through this “virtual border” at our ports of entry, we will know who violates our entry requirements, who overstays or violates the terms of their stay, and who should be welcome again. He described the process to involve an interview, the taking of a photograph and two fingerprints, and a database check. Upon departure, the person’s identity will be verified and departure date captured. The system is not to be static, but one, which tracks, changes in immigration status and makes adjustments accordingly. No clear statement is made that legal permanent residents, Canadian citizens, or Mexicans holding laser visas, which are based already on a two flat fingerprints and a digital photo, will be exempt from this process.
5. In June of 2003, the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) released a report to congressional committees on US VISIT. [27] The report observes that the initial deployment plan for US VISIT does not provide sufficient information about system capabilities, what benefits will be delivered when, and at what cost, and how the agency plans to manage the acquisition to provide reasonable assurances that it will meet its commitments. In response to this report, Michael Garcia, head of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“BICE”), stated that GAO’s conclusion as to the provision of insufficient information by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS’), “fails to consider that the lack of specific details is attributable to a number of policy decisions that are pending, all of which directly impact the features of the system.”[28] Mr. Garcia went on to indicate that these pending issues included: whether biometric information will be captured for all people entering and exiting the U.S., whether official documents will be required of all visitors, and whether exit control procedures will be based on law enforcement interviews and biographic information about visitors, or rely on biometrics and direct observations to determine that people actually leave the country.
6. On August 18, 2003, Richard M. Stana, Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues for the GAO, sent a letter to Robert C. Bonner, the “Commissioner” of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (“BCBP”) regarding the “vulnerabilities and inefficiencies in the inspections process” at our ports of entry.[29] In this letter, Mr. Stana notes that inspectors do not always receive the training they need, inspectors lack a standard of equipment, port operations are hampered by inefficiencies related to technology and equipment, ports lack automation of routine data collection, and there is no structure in place to support the analysis and use of intelligence information. The letter also states that typically primary inspections at ports are conducted in less than 1 minute. Of the approximately 363 million persons inspected at land border ports of entry in 2002, 354 million (98 percent) were admitted after primary inspection. Those applicants for admission referred to secondary inspection for a more thorough review, totaled about 9 million in 2002. According to the GAO report issued in June of 2003, only three percent three percent of admissions went through secondary in 2002.[30]
7. In December of 2002, the Data Management Improvement Act Task Force issued a Report to Congress in which it noted that limited space at most airports, compounded by increased passenger loads and new security requirements had resulted in delays.[31] As to seaports, the report notes that the nature of the seaport environment does not lend itself to traditional inspection facilities as the majority of seaport inspections are conducted dockside or onboard the vessel. [32] In addition, facilities space for cruise terminals is extremely limited in most areas, and yet demand for space continues to increase.[33] As to land ports, the report outlines that 64 ports have less than 25% of required space without consideration of the added needs of exit control under US VISIT. [34] 40 ports apparently have between a 25 and 50% lack of required space, while 13 ports have between a 50 to 75% shortage of space. Some ports were noted to have no land for any expansion to accommodate exit control.[35]
8. In November of 2002, the GAO released a report entitled, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security.[36] This report notes that there are almost 400 U.S. ports of entry and 200 visa issuing U.S. consular posts.[37] At pedestrian and vehicle lanes at ports of entry in El Paso, for example, any time longer than 15 seconds for inspection would result in “staggering delays” to enter the U.S.[38] A fingerprint query of the INS Automated Biometric Fingerprint Identification System (“IDENT”), which is based on two fingerprints, takes an average of two minutes.[39] A query of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”) Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (“IAFIS”), which has been in existence since 1928 and is the world’s largest database with 400 million fingerprints, is targeted to take two hours to review electronically submitted prints.[40] IAFIS is based on a rolled ten print fingerprint, while the two print IDENT fingerprint database is based on flat prints. Thus, the problem of false matches on a print check is enhanced when a two print IDENT print is run against the ten print rolled IAFIS system. As of April of 2003, the database integration project of IAFIS and IDENT was two years behind schedule.[41]
9. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) has determined that only face and fingerprint biometrics have a large enough operational database for testing at this time.[42] The report recommends that ten print fingerprints be used for enrollment retention. In addition, the report notes that collecting more than two fingerprints would entail a major revamping of the INS IDENT system and the Department of State’s (“DOS”) Consular Affairs biometric collection systems.[43] Please note that currently DOS collects only two prints in the Mexican laser visa program and also is doing so now with more frequency based on the further restrictions placed worldwide on consular posts as to personal appearance waivers at the consular interview.[44] The report further states that IAFIS ten print algorithm cannot meet the IDENT/IAFIS reliability and selectivity requirements for a two print fingerprint search. In addition, the current system in place tracks about six percent of all border crossing events.[45]
10. On October 26, 2004, those nationals from the 27 countries benefiting from the must add biometrics to their passports issued after October 26, 2004.[46] Even the U.S. though will be unlikely to have upgraded its own passports to meet this standard in time.[47]
Reality Check
In the best of all biometric and database worlds, an applicant for admission would swipe a biometric based card or passport and the entry would be logged and tracked. All relevant security databases would be reviewed via the single swipe and an inspector could easily pick those subject to further review. The reality is that:
1. Ports of entry have insufficient staffing and infrastructure to implement US VISIT.
2. We don’t even know those subject to US VISIT yet.
3. US VISIT does not even seem to take into account that Mexican nationals holding laser visas already possess a biometric based document utilizing the baseline of a two print fingerprint and digitized photo.
4. Multiple databases must be accessed separately to conduct a full review of any applicant’s record.
5. IAFIS and IDENT are not integrated. DOS is basing their biometric intakes on a two print system, which does not interface well with the ten print based IAFIS system.
6. We have not accomplished sealing the border between inspection points.
7. Terrorists don’t necessarily comply with reporting rules or use ports of entry or departure.
8. If prints must be taken to verify identity on entry, it will be necessary to do so on departure for consistency and veracity. If someone intends to stay in the U.S. though, how does exit control address the issue of the person who does not leave?
9. Apparently the Request for Proposal on US VISIT has not been issued. How does this work in light of implementation in less than four months at all subject U.S. airports and seaports?
10. What staffing is necessary to go from a three percent secondary referral system to a 100% secondary referral system?
Suggestions
It would seem prudent to step back and review the situation a little further at this point. We should delay implementation of section 110 until we have specifics as to costs and efficiencies. In the meantime, funds should be allocated to enhance the placement of biometric based scanners at all ports of entry, assuming that there is a least a baseline scanner that can be used on a multitude of biometric documents. In addition, more attention should be placed on following up on compliance post-admission versus exit. If we could just track admissions, we would be making great progress. We need to step back and analyze the true benefit of exit tracking versus post admission enforcement and investigation. Then, tie this work with enhanced funding and staffing of investigations to ensure better compliance. Also, benefits based applications must be able to accessed to determine whether status has been extended or changed. In addition, legislation addressing the dilemma of undocumented immigration to fill employer needs would help reduce the amount of illegal immigration to the U.S. With the ongoing efforts to cross-train legacy INS and Customs inspectors, we are at one of our most vulnerable junctures. Targeted funding of this training as well as continuing updates is crucial. One thing is for certain, if anyone buys the sales job that US VISIT will be fully implemented as intended via legislation by the first of next year at our air and sea ports, I know some people with a bridge for sale……
[1] Kathleen Campbell Walker is the partner in charge of the Immigration section of the Kemp Smith, LLP law firm in El Paso, Texas. She has practiced on the border in El Paso for over 18 years. She is board certified in Immigration and Nationality Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, and serves as chairman of the Immigration Specialization Exam Committee. In 2002, she was elected to the National Executive Committee of the American Immigration Lawyers Association (“AILA”), and received the AILA National Advocacy award. She currently serves as AILA’s national treasurer. She testified before the House and Senate Immigration Subcommittees for AILA on the Homeland Security bill, and again before the Senate Immigration Subcommittee on the Border Security bill. She served from 1998 to 2001 as the National Chairman of the AILA National Department of State Visa Office Liaison Committee, and received an AILA Presidential Award in 2000 for this work. In addition, she is a member of the Border Advisory Council of the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts and a former president of the El Paso Foreign Trade Association for four years during which the first Dedicated Commuter Lane in Texas was the association’s primary project . This article is not written in any representative capacity on behalf of AILA. The article is the author’s opinion alone.
[2] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Press Secretary, DHS Announces new ‘U.S. VISIT System’ for Travelers as the Department Marks Its First 100 Days (April 29, 2003).
[3] Pub. L. No. 104-208 (Sept. 30, 1996).
[4] November 2002 DMIA Task Force: Data Management Improvement Act (“DMIA”) Task Force First Annual Report to Congress p. 2.
[5] Id at p. 5.
[6] Id at p. 5.
[7] Senate Judiciary Report 105-197 on S. 1360, the Border Improvement and Immigration Act of 1997 (“BIIA”), ( June 1, 1998).
[8] Id. at p.15.
[9] Id. at p. 15.
[10] Pub. L. No. 104-208 (Sept. 30, 1996).
[11] See two previous articles published by the author posted on AILA Infonet in the section including handouts at the 2003 New Orleans National Annual AILA Conference entitled, The Evolution of Exit Entry Control and First and Second Line of Defense (DOS, BCBP, BICE) Entry/Exit Related Deadlines and Developments (June 2003).
[12] See Testimony of Michael A. Pearson, Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, before the Subcommittee on Immigration of the Senate Judiciary Committee Regarding Border Security Issues, p. 2 (February 10, 2000).
[13]DOS Personal Appearance Waiver Cable (AILA InfoNet Document No. 03081117 August 11, 2003).
[14]Department of Homeland Security Press Release , Fact Sheet: US VISIT Program posted on www.dhs.gov website.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] The memorandum is available on AILA InfoNet at Document No. 03043047.
[18] See Foreign Press Center Briefing transcript of briefing on NSEERS provided by Kris Kobach, Counsel to the Attorney General, Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. (January 17, 2003).
[19] See announcement at 67 Fed. Reg. 66765 as to the first group of nationals subject to NSEERS, which included nationals or citizens of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, or Syria. Posted on AILA InfoNet at Document No. 02081370.
[20] See Id.
[21] See footnote 17, p.2.
[22] Statement of Senator Slade Gorton before the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration (February 10, 2000.
[23] Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-215 (June 15, 2000).
[24] Id.
[25] Id.
[26] Remarks by Undersecretary Asa Hutchinson on the Launch of the US VISIT Program, May 19, 2003. Posted on AILA InfoNet at Doc. No. 03052010 (May 20, 2003).
[27] GAO Report to Congressional Committees, Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit System Expenditure Planning (GAO-03-563 June 2003)..
[28] T. Shoop, “Plan for new entry-exit system falls short, report says,” Government Executive Magazine (June 9, 2003).
[29] R. M. Stana, Letter to the Honorable Robert C. Bonner regarding Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the Inspections Process (GAO-03-1084R August 18, 2003)
[30] GAO Report to Congressional Committees, Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit System Expenditure Planning p. 6 (GAO-03-563 June 2003).
[31] November 2002 DMIA Task Force: Data Management Improvement Act (“DMIA”) Task Force First Annual Report to Congress p. 159.
[32] Id at 162.
[33] Id.
[34] Id at 157.
[35] Id.
[36] GAO Report, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security (GAO-03-174 November 2002).
[37] Id at 2 and 8.
[38] Id at 119.
[39] Id at 149.
[40] Id.
[41] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluations and Inspections Division Report, Status of IDENT/IAFIS Integration (Report number I-2003-05) (AILA Document ID No. 03070211 July 2, 2003).
[42] U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of State, National Institute of Standards and Technology Report to Congress, Use of Technology Standards and Interoperable Databases with Machine Readable, Tamper Resistant Travel Documents (January 2003 at p. 4).
[43] Id at 5.
[44] DOS Personal Appearance Waiver Cable (AILA InfoNet Document No. 03081117 August 11, 2003).
[45]. U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of State, National Institute of Standards and Technology Report to Congress, Use of Technology Standards and Interoperable Databases with Machine Readable, Tamper Resistant Travel Documents (January 2003 at p. 5).
[46] Section 303, Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173 (May 14, 2002).
[47] B. Bergstein, U.S. now demanding biometric technology, Associated Press (August 25, 2003).
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